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I. Introduction
Many people credit a Texas civil rights case as the parent of envi-
ronmental justice litigation. That case, brought in 1979 by Linda
McKeever Bullard on behalf of residents of Houston's Northwood
Manor, was the first suit in the country to challenge the siting of an
unwanted waste facility on civil rights grounds.' The suit charged
that the City of Houston and Browning Ferris Industries were dis-
criminating against the mostly African American residents of
Northwood Manor by placing a garbage dump in that neighbor-
hood.2 This ground-breaking lawsuit was the inspiration for the
legal piece to the environmental justice movement, a movement
which was then in its infancy.
t Staff attorney, California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation; General Coun-
sel, Center on Race, Poverty & the Environment. A.B. Stanford University; J.D.
Harvard University. The thoughts and strategies in this Article have been developed
by dozens of grassroots activists and attorneys in the environmental justice movement
throughout the country in the last five years, and are drawn from my experiences in
that movement. Many of the insights on litigation are drawn from my colleague and
teacher, Ralph Santiago Abascal, who serves as Executive Director of the Center on
Race, Poverty & the Environment, and who provided helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this Article.
1. Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex.
1979).
2. Id.; see also ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 53 (1990); infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
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Many lawsuits have been brought as part of the environmental
justice movement since Linda Bullard's historic case, and commu-
nity groups and attorneys in the movement have learned a great
deal in the past fifteen years. In this Article, I hope to synthesize
some of the lessons we as movement lawyers have learned in order
to offer a practitioner's perspective on environmental justice cases.
My ambition in setting out these lessons is to allow community
groups and attorneys entering the struggle to learn from our mis-
takes, emulate our successes, and avoid re-inventing the wheel.
Before a community group embarks on a legal course, however,
a threshold question must be answered: Will a lawsuit help or hurt
the community's struggle? There are serious strategic and tactical
drawbacks to lawsuits generally and civil rights lawsuits particu-
larly.3 Because environmental justice struggles are at heart polit-
ical and economic, not legal, a legal response is often inappropriate
or unavailable. In fact, bringing a lawsuit may ensure loss of the
struggle at hand, or cause significant disempowerment of the client
community. Without addressing the strategic and tactical draw-
backs of litigation, which I and others have detailed elsewhere,4
this Article assumes that a community group has decided to pursue
litigation.
This Article will only discuss siting cases, as siting disputes have
been the primary context for environmental justice litigation thus
far.' Other legal avenues, such as citizen enforcement 6 and pres-
3. These drawbacks are more fully laid out in Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as
the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19
ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 641-52 (1992) [hereinafter Cole, Environmental Poverty Law] and
Luke W. Cole, Remedies for Environmental Racism: A View from the Field, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 1991, 1997 (1992) [hereinafter Cole, Remedies for Environmental Racism].
4. See, e.g., Michael Bennett & Cruz Reynoso, California Rural Legal Assistance
(CRLA): Survival of a Poverty Law Practice, 1 CHICANO L. REV. 1, 20 (1972) (stating
that farmworkers are not necessarily benefitted from winning cases in Supreme Court
if they are not organized to take advantage of victory); Michael J. Fox, Some Rules for
Community Lawyers, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1, 5-6 (1980) (discussing deflation of
community group by legal action).
5. This Article does not discuss personal injury suits brought on behalf of victims
of toxic poisoning, which have disempowered and disillusioned many low-income
communities and communities of color. While some community members may in the
long run receive compensation for their injuries, many plaintiffs in such suits see little
money, if any at all, in these suits, which often last for years. See, Marcia Coyle &
Claudia MacLachlan, Getting Victimized by the Legal System, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 9,
1992, at S8.
6. See, e.g., Vernice Miller, Planning, Power and Politics: A Case Study of the
Land Use and Siting History of the North River Water Pollution Control Plant, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 707, 718-22 (1994).
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suring agencies to adopt meaningful regulations,7 have sometimes
proved successful and are fertile ground for further exploration.
Lawyers in the movement should continue to try novel ideas in
hopes of developing new legal approaches.8
The Article proposes a hierarchy of litigation strategies for attor-
neys to consider when structuring environmental justice cases,
based on our experiences at California Rural Legal Assistance's
Center on Race, Poverty & the Environment9 (CRPE), and that of
dozens of other attorneys and community groups around the coun-
try. This litigation hierarchy has four tiers: reliance on traditional
environmental law claims, unusual environmental law claims, statu-
tory civil rights claims, and Constitutional civil rights claims, in that
order. To give context to these recommendations, the Article
briefly summarizes the experiences of attorneys alleging civil rights
violations in environmental justice suits.
Finally, the Article discusses the politics of bringing civil rights
claims in environmental justice cases. In our experience, alleging
civil rights claims-especially as part of a lawsuit that also uses en-
vironmental laws-can be useful in building morale, raising the
7. For example, a series of cases to get states to adopt meaningful lead poisoning
screening tests has had an important effect in getting more children tested for such
poisoning. The cases, masterminded by an historic coalition of legal services attor-
neys (National Health Law Project), community groups (People United for a Better
Oakland), environmentalists (Natural Resources Defense Council), and civil rights
groups (NAACP Legal Defense Fund), has had success in California and Texas, suc-
cesses which caused the Medicaid system nationally to adopt the lead screening medi-
cal test sought by the groups. See Thompson v. Raiford, No. 3-92 CV 1539-R (N.D.
Tex. filed Oct. 21, 1992); Mathews v. Coye, No. C-90-3620-EFL (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16,
1991) (Stipulation for Settlement and Dismissal Without Prejudice); Jane Perkins,
Lead Poisoning and Poor Children, 1 ENVTL. POVERTY L. WORKING GROUP NEWS 13
(1993) (discussing the cases and strategy).
8. One such approach would be to use lead poisoning as a defense in eviction
proceedings, or even criminal suits. See Deborah W. Denno, Considering Lead
Poisoning as a Criminal Defense, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 377 (1993). Denno's work is
an intriguing extension of Richard Delgado's "societal fault" proposal for criminal
law, in which society (rather than an individual) is held responsible for failing to elimi-
nate crime-causing factors that could have been prevented. Richard Delgado, "Rotten
Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Envi-
ronmental Deprivation? 3 L. & INEQUALITY J. 9, 89 (1985).
9. The Center serves as a mini back-up center for legal services offices nation-
wide, offering resources, technical assistance, consultation, training, and co-counseling
in environmental justice cases. The Center also coordinates the national Environ-
mental Poverty Law Working Group, and publishes two newsletters, Environmental
Poverty Law Working Group News and Race, Poverty & the Environment. Through
this work we interact with lawyers and community groups around the country who
face a variety of environmental problems.
1994]
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profile of a community's struggle and educating the public and gov-
ernment officials about environmental racism.
II. A Litigation Hierarchy
Based on our work, research and consultations with other com-
munity activists and attorneys nationwide, we at CRPE have devel-
oped a litigation hierarchy which we recommend using in
environmental justice siting cases. This hierarchy suggests using
the following legal tools, in the following order:
1. Environmental laws, especially those which focus on proce-
dure, applied in a traditional manner.
2. Environmental laws, particularly those which mandate pub-
lic participation, used with a twist.
3. Civil rights laws, particularly Title VI 10 and Title VIII"I of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
4. Constitutional claims, based on the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Our approach is a studied response to a simple problem: we as a
movement are not winning civil rights cases. At the same time, we
don't want to completely abandon the potentially fruitful and edu-
cational effects of using civil rights claims in environmental justice
litigation. Using civil rights laws in conjunction with environmen-
tal challenges allows community groups to continue to push the
boundaries of the law while also having a chance to win.
A. Environmental Law, Straight Up
Generally, it is easiest to block a facility using environmental
laws. Judges are familiar with such challenges and understand
them; the law is fairly clear and generally supports credible chal-
lenges to improperly permitted facilities. Thus, we put traditional
use of environmental laws at the top of the litigation hierarchy. 12
Litigation on behalf of poor communities and communities of
color fighting environmental dangers dates at least to the 1960s,
although those bringing the suits did not see themselves as part of
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1988).
12. Richard Lazarus, although no longer a practitioner, has come to the same rec-
ommendation based on the relative success rates of environmental suits and civil
rights suits. See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distribu-
tional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 827 (1993).
1994] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE LITIGATION 527
the environmental justice movement.13 Before Linda Bullard's
Houston suit, legal services attorneys had brought suits to ban dan-
gerous pesticides on behalf of farmworkers,'14 and to stop strip min-
ing on behalf of poor rural residents. 5 Since the Bean case, legal
services and other attorneys have brought dozens of suits on behalf
of low-income communities, many of them communities of color,
in environmental justice struggles.' 6 Most of these suits-many of
them successful-were based on environmental, rather than civil
rights, laws. Environmental law challenges in the context of envi-
ronmental justice struggles have a proven track record of success.
The elementary lesson of practicing environmental law is focus
on procedure. Many state and federal environmental laws, espe-
cially those related to permitting facilities, are procedurally ori-
ented. They set out a series of procedural hoops to be jumped
13. However, those involved in early suits, both client groups and attorneys, con-
sidered themselves parts of other social movements such as the civil rights, labor or
farmworker rights movements.
14. In fact, a case brought by California Rural Legal Assistance on behalf of six
women farmworkers, later joined by the fledgling Environmental Defense Fund, suc-
ceeded in banning DDT. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Environmental Defense Fund v. Dep't of
Health, Educ. & Welfare, 428 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Environmental Defense
Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
15. See, e.g., Haynes v. Pioneer Coal Company, No. Civ. 4385 (Letcher Cir. Ct.
filed Sept. 3, 1971) (case by legal services office Appalachian Research and Defense
Fund of Kentucky to prevent strip mining of property); APPALACHIAN RESEARCH
AND DEFENSE FUND OF KENTUCKY, 1973 ANNUAL REPORT 8 ("The legal staff has
been very active on behalf of citizens groups in the mountains in environmental litiga-
tion and in attempting to see that meaningful environmental legislation and regula-
tions are passed."). I thank my friend and colleague John Rosenberg, a long-time
environmental poverty lawyer and director of Appalachian Research and Defense
Fund in Prestonsburg, Kentucky, for these historical cases.
16. See, e.g., Jeffrey Avina, California Communities at Risk: California Rural Legal
Assistance and the CRLA Foundation, ENVTL. POVERTY LAW WORKING GROUP
NEWS, Summer 1992, at 7; Kerry Bader, Coalfield Lawyers: Appalachian Research
and Defense Fund of Kentucky, ENVTL. POVERTY L. WORKING GROUP NEWS, Sum-
mer 1992, at 3; Lucy Billings, Poor Losing Some Federal Protection, ENVTL. POVERTY
LAW WORKING GROUP NEWS, Fall 1992, at 19; Carl Christensen, The Unique Land
Use Controversies of Hawaii: Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation, ENVTL. POVERTY
LAW WORKING GROUP NEWS, Summer 1992, at 8; Cole, Environmental Poverty Law,
supra note 3, at 670-71 n.227; Miles Dolinger, Fighting Back Through Education:
South Chicago Legal Clinic's Environmental Law Program, 1 ENVTL. POVERTY LAW
WORKING GROUP NEWS, Summer 1992, at 5; Legal Services Tackles Lead Poisoning,
ENVTL. POVERTY LAW WORKING GROUP NEWS, Fall 1992, at 24; Jane Perkins, Lead
Poisoning and Poor Children, ENVrL. POVERTY LAW WORKING GROUP NEWS, Fall
1992, at 5, 13; Catherine Ruckelshaus, My Health or My Job, ENVTL. POVERTY LAW
WORKING GROUP NEWS, Fall 1992, at 17; Gina Snyder, On the Front Lines: A Sum-
mary of One Program's Response to the Crisis of Childhood Lead Poisoning, ENVTL.
POVERTY LAW WORKING GROUP NEWS, Fall 1992, at 15.
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through, and once an applicant has successfully jumped through
the hoops, the applicant receives a permit.
This tier of the hierarchy looks the most similar to "traditional"' 7
environmental lawyering. While the clients look different, and the
case should be done in the context of a political organizing drive,
the legal tools used are the same. To be a good environmental jus-
tice lawyer, one must be a good environmental lawyer. This nuts-
and-bolts knowledge of arcane statutes is the least sexy part of en-
vironmental justice law, to be sure, but perhaps the most impor-
tant. In this tier of the hierarchy, traditional environmental law
groups can be most helpful to the environmental justice move-
ment"8 by sharing their skills and knowledge of environmental law.
B. Environmental Law, With a Twist
We also believe there is great latitude for pushing the boundaries
of environmental laws, especially those which stress public partici-
pation. Again, this strategy relies on attacks on the procedure of
granting permits, rather than its substance or the outcome. This
tier involves creative uses of environmental laws, approaches which
read and employ the laws in non-traditional ways.
Sometimes this approach means only a literal reading of a stat-
ute. In our representation of the community group El Pueblo para
el Aire y Agua Limpio of Kettleman City, California in its chal-
lenge to the siting of a toxic waste incinerator, we made a simple
argument based on the public participation language of the Califor-
17. I use "traditional" rather than "mainstream" self-consciously, although I have
for years used "mainstream" to describe the so-called "Big Ten" environmental
groups. Several activists with the SouthWest Organizing Project recently pointed out
to me that the grassroots movement is far more "mainstream" in its community-based
tactics and heterogenous make-up than are the traditional, litigation-oriented envi-
ronmental groups, overwhelmingly run and staffed by middle- and upper-class white
men. Charles Jordan & Donald Snow, Diversification, Minorities, and the Mainstream
Environmental Movement, in VoIcEs FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT: PER-
SPECTIVES FOR A NEW ERA 71, 73 (Donald Snow ed., 1991). I thus join the mini-
movement to reclaim the "mainstream" mantle for grassroots organizers, and thank
Jean Gauna and Louis Head for this insight.
18. I make this recommendation with the significant caveat that traditional envi-
ronmental law groups have different perspective, tactics, motives, and goals from
grassroots environmentalists. Robert D. Bullard & Beverly Wright, The Quest for
Environmental Equity: Mobilizing the Black Community for Social Change, 1 RACE,
POVERTY & THE ENV'T 3 (July 1990); Cole, Environmental Poverty Law, supra note 3,
at 639-47. Chief among the differing tactics is the traditional environmental law
groups' central reliance on litigation. As the executive director of the Sierra Club
Legal Defense Fund stated in 1988: "Litigation is the most important thing the envi-
ronmental movement has done over the past fifteen years." Tom Turner, The Legal
Eagles, 10 AMicus JOURNAL 25, 27 (1988).
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nia Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). 19 As California courts
have explained, ultimately public participation is not an end in it-
self. Rather, it is the means to the larger ends of self-government
and the accountability of public servants to those they serve, the
citizenry. Full compliance with CEQA and similar public informa-
tion statutes is required to enable the public to "determine the en-
vironmental and economic values of their elected and appointed
officials, thus allowing for appropriate action come election day
should a majority of the voters disagree."'2 One of CEQA's cen-
tral purposes is to provide for informed self-government through
public participation.2 '
CEQA requires public participation in the environmental review
of proposed facilities, including public comment on the environ-
mental impact report (EIR) prepared to analyze such facilities. As
Kings County, the local agency, published the EIR in English,
although Kettleman City is ninety-five percent Latino and forty
percent monolingual Spanish-speaking, community residents felt
they had been excluded from participation in environmental re-
view. In our suit to block the incinerator, we argued that CEQA's
public participation language required Spanish translation of the
19. CAL. Pun. RES. CODE §§ 21000-22080 (1970). CEQA is modelled on the fed-
eral National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988);
many states have mini-NEPA statutes similar to CEQA.
20. People v. County of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 3d 830, 842 (1974).
21. The inclusion of the public in the environmental review process is the corner-
stone of environmental impact review statutes such as CEQA and NEPA. The
CEQA Guidelines make this clear:
The basic purposes of CEQA are to:
(1) Inform governmental decisionmakers and the public about the poten-
tial, significant environmental effects of proposed activities.
(4) Disclose to the public the reasons why a governmental agency ap-
proved the project in the manner the agency chose if significant environmen-
tal effects are involved.
CEQA Guidelines § 15002(a) (emphasis added).
These requirements enable officials and members of the public considering a pro-
ject to make an "independent, reasoned judgment" about the proposed project and its
impact on the environment. Santiago County Water Dist. v. County of Orange, 118
Cal. App. 3d 818, 831 (1981). For this reason, California Courts have consistently
interpreted CEQA to call for the fullest possible participation by the public: "[T]he
'privileged position' that members of the public hold in the CEQA process . . .is
based on a belief that citizens can make important contributions to environmental
protection and on notions of democratic decision-making...." Concerned Citizens of
Costa Mesa, Inc. v. 32d Dist. Agric. Ass'n, 42 Cal. 3d 929, 936 (1986) (quoting Daniel
P. Selmi, The Judicial Development of the California Environmental Quality Act, 18
U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 197, 215-16 (1984)).
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EIR documents in such situations.2 2 The judge relied on this claim,
among others, in overturning the County's approval of the toxic
waste incinerator. He ruled that Spanish-speaking people had
been excluded from the decision-making process-in effect, that
their rights to public participation had been violated.23
When trying a new twist, we strongly recommend that it be part
of a lawsuit with more traditional allegations of violations of envi-
ronmental law. In this way, the attorney protects the interests of
the community group in the event that a judge feels the twist is too
radical.
C. Civil Rights Statutes
The third level of the hierarchy is civil rights statutes. The move-
ment for environmental justice owes much of its history, inspira-
tion and tactics to the Civil Rights Movement,24 and it is thus no
surprise that the legal activity growing out of the movement should
try to use civil rights laws. Adding civil rights claims as part of an
environmental law suit allows a community group to paint a fuller
picture for the judge about what is actually going on in a commu-
nity.25 It also has significant political import, as discussed below.26
22. Our experience with this case is another recommendation for community in-
volvement in framing the legal issues: our legal theory-that CEQA's public involve-
ment necessitated translation of documents into Spanish-came directly from the
residents of Kettleman City, who continually requested translation so as to take part
in the environmental review process.
23. El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings, 22 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,357 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 30, 1991). This case, while only a trial court case
and thus having no precedential value, has galvanized community activists to demand
translation in other community struggles and has led the California Department of
Toxic Substances Control to provide interpreters and translation of documents in
other Spanish-speaking rural communities in California. See, e.g., DEP'T OF Toxic
SUBSTANCES CONTROL, CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, Aviso PUBLICO DEL
PERMISO PRELIMINAR PARA EL ALMACENAJE, TRATAMIENTO, Y RECICLAMENTO DE
DESECHOS PELIGROSOS DE LA PLANTA PURE ETCH, SALINAS, CALIFORNIA (1994)
(public notice).
24. Bullard & Wright, supra note 18.
25. This strategy has its roots in a case from the early 1970s which sought to block
the construction of the Century Freeway in Los Angeles. Brought on both civil rights
and environmental grounds, the suit prevailed on environmental grounds and the civil
rights claims were not reached. Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1972),
affd en banc sub nom, Keith v. California Highway Comm'n, 506 F.2d 696 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975). In a later action to enforce the consent decree
arising out of the case, Title VIII claims were used to force local government agencies
to provide replacement housing for those people displaced by the freeway project.
Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 482-86 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 813 (1989).
26. See infra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
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If a community group wishes to bring civil rights claims as part of
its legal strategy, it behooves their attorney to look at civil rights
laws and regulations, especially those that allow proof of a viola-
tion based on discriminatory impact rather than discriminatory in-
tent.27 In our experience, lawyers have relied far too much on
allegations of Constitutional violations, which require a group to
prove discriminatory intent and are thus very difficult to win.
Title VI and Title VIII are two central civil rights statutes which
are potentially available and appropriate in environmental justice
struggles. A brief overview of each statute and some potential ap-
proaches to using them follows.
1. Title VI
Title VI prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race, color,
and national origin by "any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance., 28 While litigants under Title VI itself must
prove that a defendant intentionally discriminated, the regulations
implementing Title VI across the federal government generally
state that discriminatory effect (or disparate impact) alone is
enough to show unlawful discrimination.29
The discriminatory effect standard is codified in the regulations
of most federal agencies that one might encounter in an environ-
27. The difference between discriminatory intent (also known as "disparate treat-
ment") and discriminatory effect (or "disparate impact") was set out by the Supreme
Court in the employment context as follows:
"Disparate treatment" . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimina-
tion. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of dis-
criminatory motive is crucial ....
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress
"disparate impact." The latter involves employment practices that are
facially neutral in the treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more
harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by a business
necessity. Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required
under a disparate-impact theory .... Either theory may, of course, be ap-
plied to a particular set of facts.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977)
(emphasis added).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
29. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 591-04 (1983); see id. at
618-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1984). But see
NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that disparate
impact may be adequate to establish unlawful discrimination).
For a complete list of all federal cabinet Departments with Title VI regulations
codifying the discriminatory effect standard, see Paul K. Sonn, Fighting Minority Un-
derrepresentation in Publicly Funded Construction Projects After Croson: A Title VI
Litigation Strategy, 101 YALE L.J. 1577, 1581 n.25 (1992).
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mental justice suit, including the Environmental Protection
Agency 3° and the Departments of Agriculture,31 Defense,32 En-
ergy33 and the Interior.34 Because many state agencies receive fed-
eral funding (often channeled through particular federal agencies),
and because Title VI broadly defines "program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance, ' 35 Title VI may be applied to state and
local agencies. Title VI applies to an entire agency if even one part
of that agency receives federal funding.36 Because of this broad
coverage, most state agencies likely to be encountered in an envi-
ronmental justice suit are probably subject to Title VI.37
Strategies for employing Title VI in environmental justice and
other cases have been well discussed in legal literature,38 and the
approach has been used in a series of cases. 39 So far, environmen-
tal justice cases have relied on the regulations implementing Title
VI, rather than the statute itself. These regulations, used in the
context of challenging freeway sitings, have given the environmen-
tal justice movement one of its only Title VI legal victories thus far.
In that case, residents of the African-American Crest Street
neighborhood in Durham, North Carolina intervened in the siting
process for a freeway which was to be built through their commu-
30. 40 C.F.R. § 7.35 (1993).
31. 7 C.F.R. § 15.3(b)(2) (1993).
32. 32 C.F.R. § 195.3 (1993).
33. 10 C.F.R. § 1040.13(c)-(d) (1993).
34. 43 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d-4a) (1988). For a compendium of the various federal
grants to state and local governments, consult sources such as OFFICE OF MANAGE-
MENT AND BUDGET & U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, 1991 CATALOG OF
FEDERAL DOMESTIC ASSISTANCE (1991) or ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A CATALOG OF FEDERAL GRANT-IN-AID PROGRAMS TO
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: GRANTS FUNDED FY 1989 (1989).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d-4a) (1988). As Paul Sonn points out, however, "in order
for Title VI limits to attach, federal funds must go to the particular program or activ-
ity funded. Receipt of funds by one agency within a state government is not sufficient
to extend Title VI coverage to activities of other agencies, even when all are subdivi-
sions of the same chartered governmental unit." Sonn, supra note 29.
37. This is particularly true in the hazardous waste area, where most states receive
federal monies under the Resource Conservation Recovery Act and the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("Superfund"). See
Lazarus, supra note 12, at 835 n.211.
38. James H. Colopy, The Road Less Travelled: Pursuing Environmental Justice
Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125 (1994);
Lazarus, supra note 12, at 834-39; Sonn, supra note 29, at 1577.
39. Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor & Poisoned: Minority
Grassroots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J. OF L. & PUB.
POL'Y 69 (1991).
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nity.40 The Crest Street Community Council, represented by the
local legal services office, North Central Legal Assistance Program,
used Title VI in a complaint to the US Department of Transporta-
tion (DOT) challenging the state's freeway construction plans.
Upon investigation, DOT informed the state that there was "rea-
sonable cause to believe that the construction of the expressway
along the alignment proposed in the Draft [Environmental Impact
Statement] would constitute a prima facie violation of Title VI.'41
In a negotiated settlement, the state agreed to reroute the pro-
posed freeway and modify an interchange to preserve the commu-
nity church and park. 2 To this author's knowledge, this represents
the first successful use of Title VI to stop a locally-unwanted land
use, albeit at the administrative level.
Another freeway case, arising out of Cleveland, did not fare as
well.43 In the Cleveland case, although the community group Con-
cerned Citizens Against 1-670 demonstrated that the routing of the
proposed 1-670 freeway would be through neighborhoods that
ranged from fifty to ninety percent African-American-according
to the Court a "prima facie showing of disparate effect upon racial
minorities"aa-the defendant was able to overcome that hurdle by
showing that alternative routes would have had more negative im-
pact on African American neighborhoods.45 A third freeway case,
40. North Carolina Dep't of Transp. v. Crest St. Community Council, Inc., 479
U.S. 6, 9 (1986).
41. Id. at 9.
42. Id. at 10. The lawsuit that emerged out of the Crest Street Community Council
case went all the way to the Supreme Court not on the siting issue but on the issue of
whether or not the community group's attorneys were entitled to attorneys' fees for-
their work. In another narrow reading of civil rights laws, Justice O'Connor found
that the attorneys, although successful at the administrative level in resolving the civil
rights dispute in favor of the community group, should not be compensated because
they had not brought a lawsuit at the same time. Id. at 6. This bizarre reading of the
law was vigorously opposed by the dissenting opinion signed by Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmun. Id. at 16.
43. Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110
(S.D. Ohio 1984).
44. Id. at 127.
45. "[lIt is plain from the record that construction of 1-670 would have substan-
tially less impact upon racial minorities than would the construction of a freeway
along 17th Avenue, the major alternative location for a freeway." Id. This narrow
reading of the law allowed the end result of a disparate impact on the African Ameri-
can community simply because the agency building the freeway had looked at another
route that would have an even greater impact on African Americans in Cleveland.
Under the somewhat twisted ruling of Damian, it would appear that government
agencies could discriminate at will in the siting of facilities, as long as they also consid-
ered even more discriminatory siting possibilities as well.
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arising out of Oakland, California, has yet to be decided on the
merits.46
The results in Crest Street Community Council, as well as in Title
VI cases in other areas such as municipal service provision,47 indi-
cate that Title VI cases have promise. The lesson of Crest Street
may be that intervention using civil rights statutes at the adminis-
trative level is the strategy with the most chance of success.4 8 It is
up to us to continue to make Title VI work in environmental jus-
tice cases.
2. Title VIII
Title VIII offers environmental justice attorneys another possi-
ble statutory base for a civil rights claim. 49 Title V11150 bars the
refusal "to sell or rent ... or otherwise make unavailable, or deny,
a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, famil-
ial status, or national origin,'"" and bars discrimination "against
any person in the... sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision
of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race,
color, religion, sex, familial status or national origin. '' 52 Although
there has yet to be a reported case involving an environmental jus-
tice dispute, it is an intriguing statute 53 for several reasons.
First, the statute does not require proof of intentional discrimi-
nation to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.5 4 A plain-
46. Clean Air Alternatives Coalition v. United States Dep't of Transp., No. C-93-
0721-VRW (N.D. Cal. filed March 2, 1993).
47. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F.Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (find-
ing Title VI and Equal Protection Clause were violated when black residents were not
provided same municipal services as white residents); see infra notes 69-74 and accom-
panying text.
48. However, attorneys are not eligible for attorneys fees unless the dispute actu-
ally goes to court. Crest Street Community Council, 479 U.S. at 16.
49. For a more extended treatment of Title VIII, see Robert G. Schwemm, Hous-
ING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION, ch. 10-13; and Jon C. Dubin, From Junk-
yards to Gentrification: Exploiting a Right to Protective Zoning in Low Income
Communities, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739 (1993).
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1988).
51. Id. § 3604(a).
52. Id. § 3604(b).
53. We included a Title VIII claim in our case, El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua
Limpio v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., No. C-91-2083-OWW (E.D. Cal. filed
July 8, 1991), but it was not reached because we won a related state court case which
blocked the incinerator in question. Title VIII strategies and drawbacks are briefly
explored in Lazarus, supra note 12, at 153-55.
54. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied
422 U.S. 1042 ("effect, not motivation, is the touchstone"); Burney v. Housing Auth.
of Beaver County, 551 F.Supp. 746, 770 (D. Pa. 1982); Williamsburg Fair Hous.
Comm. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 493 F.Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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tiff need only prove that the conduct of the defendant actually or
predictably results in racial discrimination, i.e. that it has discrimi-
natory impact.5 5 To rebut a prima facie case, a defendant must
then prove that its conduct is justified in theory and practice by a
legitimate interest, and that no feasible alternative course of action
would serve the interest with less discriminatory impact.56
Second, the statute applies to local government agencies 57 and,
more importantly, to those agencies' zoning decisions.58 This offers
environmental justice advocates a tool with which to challenge gov-
ernment rezoning of residential neighborhoods in communities of
color to allow noxious facilities or other inappropriate land uses-
a historical practice which Yale Rabin calls "expulsive zoning. '59
Third, in contrast to Title VI, which reaches only recipients of
federal funds, Title VIII reaches private and governmental defend-
ants without regard to their receipt of federal monies.60
Fourth, although the statute is written to narrowly apply to fair
housing cases,61 it has been used to challenge the "segregative ef-
fect" of government decisions-that is, decisions which have the
impact of increasing or perpetuating segregation. 62 In some envi-
ronmental justice disputes, it could be argued that zoning changes
which allow inappropriate land uses in residential communities are
both 1) closely enough related to the "provision of services or facil-
ities" for sale or rental of housing that they implicate Title VIII,
and 2) have a segregative effect. These two hurdles-the nexus to
55. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184-85.
56. United States v. City of Parma, 494 F.Supp. 1049, 1055 (N.D. Ohio 1980), affd,
661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982).
57. See, e.g., City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1183-84 (Title VIII applies to munici-
pal corporation).
58. Id.; NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.), aff'd 488 U.S. 14
(1988); Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 728 F.Supp. 1396 (D. Minn.
1990), aff'd 923 F.2d 91 (cir. 1991).
59. Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: the Inequitable Legacy of Euclid, in ZONING
AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 101 (Charles Haar & Jerrold Kayden eds., 1990). An
example might be changing zoning laws to allow an automobile manufacturing plant
in a residential community. See id. at 109-13; Bob Anderson, Industries Crowding out
Communities: Lack of Siting Law Leaves Tiny Towns Enclosed, Enraged, BATON
ROUGE SUNDAY ADVOCATE, May 10, 1992, at 1A (local decisionmakers quick to
change zoning laws to allow industry into residential neighborhoods).
60. See Schwemm, supra note 49, § 12.3. Title VIII even reaches the federal gov-
ernment, which is not subject to Title VI. Id. § 12.3(4)(d).
61. Some of the limitations on Title VIII approaches are discussed in Lazarus,
supra note 12, at 153-55.
62. See, e.g., U.S. v. City of Parma, 494 F.Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (challeng-
ing city's actions in preventing people of color from taking up residence).
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housing and the actual segregative effect of a proposed land use-
are high, but may be surmountable in the right case.
One recent case involving siting provides instructive clues for
surmounting the first hurdle. In the case, which challenged the sit-
ing of a baseball stadium to house the Chicago White Sox, mem-
bers of the South Armour Square Neighborhood Association
argued that the site was selected, and the neighborhood accord-
ingly destroyed, for discriminatory reasons.63
In Laramore v. Illinois Sports Facilities Authority, the Neighbor-
hood Association alleged that the building of the stadium would
isolate plaintiff residents "from their neighbors and from shopping
and other services[,] constitut[ing] discrimination in the provision
of services or facilities in connection with the sale or rental of a
dwelling, in violation of § 3604(b)" of Title VIII.6 The court dis-
missed the claim, stating:.
The scope of § 3604(b) depends on whether the language "in
connection with" refers to the "sale or rental of a dwelling" or
more broadly to a "dwelling." The Court finds that the most
natural reading of the statute is the narrower reading. See
Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n v. County of St.
Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1984)(§ 3604(b) prohibits
"discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in con-
nection with the sale or rental of a dwelling"). Even under a
broad reading, however, "services or facilities" refers to "serv-
ices generally provided by governmental units such as police and
fire protection or garbage collection." Id. Section 3604(b) can-
not be extended to a decision such as the selection of a stadium
site and plaintiffs therefore do not state a cause of action under
Title VIII.65
The Laramore case is interesting in that in a "kitchen sink" ap-
proach, it also involved Title VI and equal protection challenges to
the siting. Id. at 448-452. Of particular interest to environmental
justice advocates, in ruling on the equal protection claim, the Court
found "no reason to dismiss an otherwise properly pleaded equal
protection claim on the sole ground that the challenged actions
concern issues of land use and eminent domain." Id. at 451.
The second hurdle, proving segregative effect, may be less diffi-
cult to overcome. Anecdotally, and based on common sense, one
can easily argue that once a locally unwanted land use is allowed
63. Laramore v. Illinois Sports Facilities, 722 F. Supp. 443 (N.D. I11. 1989).
64. Id. at 452.
65. Id.
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into a neighborhood, whites tend to move out-thus the facility
has had the effect of increasing segregation. This has been true in
several situations in California,66 as well as in new looks at old
studies on the disproportionate impact of garbage dump sitings.67
Such proof in a case involving the siting of a new facility might
involve longitudinal studies looking at a series of similarly situated
communities and charting the demographic make-up of a commu-
nity when a facility is first built and over the years following. If
indeed, as one might suspect, the siting of the facilities had segrega-
tive effect in similar communities, it could be plausibly argued that
the proposed facility would have similar effect and thus violate Ti-
tle VIII. In a situation of renewing a permit for an existing facility,
or for the expansion of such a facility, studies of the demographics
of the surrounding neighborhood before the facility was sited,
when it was sited, and at various intervals since it was sited would
be useful. If permit renewals or expansions have been approved in
the past, the resulting effect (if any) of those government actions
on the racial composition of the neighborhood could similarly be
charted.
One problem with Title VIII claims is that even if a plaintiff
group can make a prima facie case of discrimination, a defendant
can argue that the siting or zoning decision is based on a legitimate
interest, and that no alternative course of action could be taken
that would serve the interest with less discriminatory impact.68
3. Other Possibilities
Another line of argument, derived from the municipal service
cases of the 1970s and 1980s, deserves more attention. In a series
of cases brought under the 14th Amendment and Title VI, courts
66. Kettleman City, for example, was 84% Latino in the 1980 Census, just one
year after the Chemical Waste Management toxic dump was sited nearby, and 95%
Latino ten years later in the 1990 Census.
67. In a reevaluation of Professor Robert Bulard's ground-breaking studies of
solid waste landfill siting in Houston, Vicki Been determined that "[tihe number of
African-Americans as a percentage of the population increased between 1970 and
1980 in all the neighborhoods surrounding the landfills. That increase was by as much
as 223%, compared to a 7% increase in the African-American population of Houston
as a whole .... This trend continued between 1980 and 1990." Vicki Been, Locally
Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market
Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1403-04 (1994). But cf id. at 1399 (percentage of
African-American residents near two toxic waste sites in South Carolina decreased
between 32 and 35% from 1970 to 1990).
68. United States v. City of Parma, 494 F.Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio 1980). Title VIII
regulations expressly prohibit discriminatory provision of municipal services. 24
C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4) (1993).
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held that municipal services must be provided in a non-discrimina-
tory fashion.69 Gerald Torres, writing in this volume, discusses
some of the analogies that might be drawn between the provision
of municipal benefits and the imposition of municipal burdens, in
environmental justice disputes.70 As Derrick Bell points out, how-
ever, "issues concerning municipal services are rarely as clear cut in
large urban areas as in small towns, ' 71 a cautionary note which ap-
plies to environmental justice cases as well. Although civil rights
claims have not yet met with success, as Richard Lazarus notes,
"[t]heoretically, there is no obvious reason why those two types of
cases should be treated differently by the courts. '72
D. Constitutional Challenges
So far, almost every environmental justice civil rights case
brought has alleged only a violation of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. And so far, no plaintiff has prevailed alleging
such a claim in an environmental justice suit, although this strategy
has been tried in numerous jurisdictions around the country.73 All
69. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd en
banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (finding situation in which 97% of town's unpaved
streets were in black neighborhoods, some of which also had no sewer system and
open ditches as a drainage system, violated the 14th Amendment); Dowdell v. City of
Apopka, 511 F.Supp. 1375 (M.D. Fla. 1981), affd 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983) (find-
ing intentional discrimination in provision of municipal services violates 14th Amend-
ment and Title VI); Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1978)
(finding intentional discrimination in provision of municipal services violates 14th
Amendment and Title VI). For an excellent discussion of this line of cases, see DER-
RICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 28-33 (2d ed. & Supp. 1984).
70. Gerald Torres, Environmental Burdens and Democratic Justice, 21 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 431, 444-46 (1994); see also Rachel Godsil, Note, Remedying Environmental
Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 393, 416-21 (1991).
71. BELL, supra note 69, at 31 (1984). For this reason, Bell correctly predicts that
it will be difficult to use the municipal service cases as precedent when challenging
actions in an urban area. Id. In an illustrative example of Bell's position, civil rights
groups have had difficulty in expanding on the municipal services cases in urban hos-
pital closings. See, e.g., NAACP v. The Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir.
1981); Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980); Jackson v. Conway, 620 F.2d 680
(8th Cir. 1980) (all upholding the closing of hospitals even though the impact fell
disproportionately on black residents); BELL, supra note 69, at 31-33.
72. Lazarus, supra note 12, at 146-47. Rachel Godsil is more pessimistic. See
Godsil, supra note 70, at 420.
73. R.I.S.E. Inc. v. Kay, 768 F.Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991) (siting of garbage
dump); El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. Chemical Waste Management, No.
CV-F-91-578-OWW (E.D. Cal. filed July 7, 1991) (siting of a toxic waste incinerator);
Bordeaux Action Comm'n v. Metro. Nashville, No. 390-0214 (M.D. Tenn. filed March
12, 1990) (operation of garbage dump); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Ma-
con-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F.Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga.), affd 896
F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989) (siting of garbage dump); NAACP v. Gorsuch, No. 82-768-
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plaintiffs have lost because of the high hurdle of proving that the
discrimination evident in the siting cases was intentional on the
part of government decisionmakers, under the Supreme Court's
holdings in Washington v. Davis74 and Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Housing Development Corp.75 Under the Washington v.
Davis standard, showing discriminatory impact is not enough;
plaintiffs must show that decisionmakers had discriminatory intent
as well.
The case widely regarded as kicking off the legal piece to the
environmental justice movement, Bean v. Southwestern Waste
Management,76 was an equal protection suit. The facts and holding
of the suit have been extensively detailed elsewhere in this vol-
ume 7 and in the literature.78 While the Northwood Manor resi-
dents ultimately lost the suit because of the intent requirement, it
had at least three important, lasting outcomes. First, Houston re-
stricted the dumping of garbage near public facilities such as
schools, a form of zoning that was unprecedented in the only major
U.S. city without zoning laws.79 Second, the idea of using civil
rights law to combat environmental racism was born. And third,
the lawsuit channelled Linda Bullard's husband, Robert Bullard,
into the ground-breaking sociological research on environmental
justice he has continued to this day. °
CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. August 10, 1982) (siting of PCB dump); Bean v. Southwestern
Waste Management, 482 F.Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), affd without op., 782 F.2d 1038
(5th Cir. 1986) (siting of garbage dump).
74. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
75. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
76. 482 F.Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
77. See Torres, supra note 70, at 440-42; Rae Zimmerman, Issues of Classification
in Environmental Equity: How We Manage Is How We Measure, 21 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 633, 660-62 (1994).
78. See, e.g., BULLARD, supra note 2, at 50-54; Anthony Chase, Assessing and Ad-
dressing Problems Posed by Environmental Racism, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 335, 355
(1993); Robert W. Collin, Environmental Equity: A Law and Planning Approach to
Environmental Racism, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 495, 518-24 (1992); Godsil, supra note 70,
at 413-16; Lazarus, supra note 12, at 850.
79. BULLARD, supra note 2, at 54. Bullard also lists several other local ramifica-
tions of the suit: the Houston City Council prohibited city-owned trucks from dump-
ing at the landfill, the Texas Department of Health began to require demographic
data from landfill proponents, and residents sent a message through their protests that
they would fight any future attempts to site unwanted facilities in their neighborhood.
Id.
80. Bullard has become the pre-eminent and most prolific writer in the field. See
BULLARD, supra note 2, at 138-39 (bibliography of Professor Bullard's extensive pub-
lications); see also, ROBERT D. BULLARD, PEOPLE OF COLOR ENVIRONMENTAL
GROUPS DIRECTORY (1992); Bullard &. Wright, supra note 18; Robert D. Bullard,
Waste and Racism: A Stacked Deck?, FORUM FOR APPLIED RESEARCH & PUBLIC
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All the subsequent equal protection suits which have been de-
cided by the courts have encountered the same problem of proving
intentional discrimination: after Washington v. Davis and Arlington
Heights, the equal protection clause is no longer a viable cause of
action in most cases.81 In two other reported cases, East Bibb
Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning &
Zoning Commission,82 and R.I.S.E. v. Robert A. Kay,83 community
groups were tripped up by the intent requirement. In both cases,
neighborhood groups challenged the siting of a garbage dump in a
predominantly African-American neighborhood on equal protec-
tion grounds, and in both cases the neighborhood groups lost be-
cause the courts held the groups had not shown an intent to
discriminate on the part of local decisionmakers.84 The R.LS.E.
facts demonstrate the difficulty of proving intent: although the
court noted that the proposed landfill would be in a majority Afri-
can-American neighborhood, that all three of the currently operat-
ing garbage dumps run by the local County (sited during the
preceding 25 years) were also located in predominantly black ar-
eas, that the County solicited the approval of a wealthy white land-
owner but ignored the wishes of the African American community,
and that a landfill proposed for a majority-white community had
been rejected by the same County board, it still held that the
County had not acted with the requisite "intent" to discriminate. 85
Because of the Washington v. Davis intent requirement, civil
rights lawyers have opined that environmental justice cases using
POL'Y 29 (1993); Robert D. Bullard, Race and Environmental Justice in the United
States, 18 YALE J. OF INT'L LAW 319 (1993); Robert D. Bullard, The Threat of Envi-
ronmental Racism 73 NATURAL RESOURCES & THE ENV'T 23 (1993).
81. Cf Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We
Know How Legal Standards Work? 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991) (analyzing the
actual results in all 316 published post-Washington v. Davis cases through early 1988).
The authors show that the success rate (40% in District Court cases) is higher than
commentators' casual predictions and suggest a multiplicity of reasons for this. The
reasons are quite nuanced; any litigator facing the intent standard could profit from
reviewing Eisenberg and Johnson's analysis.
82. 706 F.Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga.), affd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989).
83. R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991)
84. Both cases have been extensively discussed in the literature. See, e.g., Torres,
supra note 70 (R.I.S.E.); Chase, supra note 78, at 355-58 (East Bibb and R.I.S.E.);
Robert W. Collin, Environmental Equity: A Law and Planning Approach to Environ-
mental Racism, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 495, 524-33 (East Bibb and R.I.S.E.); Godsil, supra
note 70, at 411-13 (East Bibb); Lazarus, supra note 12, at 145-46 (East Bibb &
R.Is.E.).
85. R.I.S.E., Inc., 768 F. Supp. at 1148-49.
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federal equal protection claims will be "certain losers. ' 86 While
there may still be hope for these claims,87 because of the difficulty
of proving discriminatory intent such claims are at the very bottom
of our litigation hierarchy.8 While one may wish to bring a Consti-
tutional claim for its political value, it should only be brought
alongside environmental and statutory civil rights claims.
III. The Politics of Environmental Justice Cases
Because the struggles in the environmental justice movement are
primarily political and economic struggles, not legal ones, as law-
yers in the movement we strongly recommend against lawsuits
whenever possible. But given the fact that sometimes a community
group must go to court,89 the group should understand not only the
legal angles of the suit, but its potential political ramifications as
well. Environmental justice lawsuits must be brought in recogni-
tion of their political nature, in order to lift a community's morale,
strengthen the community group, raise the profile of the group,
and build the political momentum necessary to win such struggles.
As Derrick Bell notes, "Litigation can and should serve lawyer and
client as a community-organizing tool, an educational forum, a
means of obtaining data, a method of exercising political leverage,
and a rallying point for public support." 90
Some of the political benefits we have found in using civil rights
claims in environmental justice suits include:
Naming names. Bringing a civil rights suit against local govern-
ment officials can be very satisfying for the community group in-
volved, because it calls the problem what it is: a violation of civil
86. Environmental Racism: Recognizing and Combatting this Civil Rights Men-
ace, American Public Health Association Conference (Oct. 25, 1993) (remarks of Bill
Lan Lee). Mr. Lee is senior counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in Los
Angeles.
87. In the ideal world, the Supreme Court would overturn Washington v. Davis
and do away with the intent standard, or Congress would pass a second Civil Rights
Restoration Act that accomplished the same purpose.
88. As Richard Lazarus writes, "Burdens of proof are difficult to overcome under
existing doctrine, but if litigation efforts were to receive additional resources, some
isolated successes might be achievable." Lazarus, supra note 12, at 828.
89. "The courts are an arena in which sometimes it is impossible not to play; we
must be there when our client groups call on us to take the struggle into that forum
.... But any legal strategy not firmly grounded in, and secondary to, a community-
based political organizing strategy, is ripe for failure." Cole, Remedies for Environ-
mental Racism supra note 3, at 1997.
90. Derrick A. Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 513 (1976).
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rights.91 It is one high-profile way of saying that the official being
sued is engaging in racist practices. This act alone makes such suits
worthwhile to some groups with long-term experiences with racist
decision-makers-filing a suit allows a community to say "offi-
cially" what has existed for a long time, and builds morale within
the group.
Publicity. Civil rights lawsuits in environmental struggles are
still relatively new, and thus command media attention-especially
if you are suing a corporate giant.9 In the Kettleman City inciner-
ator struggle, the civil rights and environmental suit we brought
was written about in national publications like the Wall Street Jour-
nal and Christian Science Monitor, and the community was fea-
tured on national news shows such as the MacNeil-Lehrer News
Hour-publicity that was important in drawing even more atten-
tion to the community's struggle and building our momentum.93
As part of its story about the suit, Business Week did a small chart
titled "Did Chem Waste Discriminate?" 94 The chart listed all of
Chem Waste's incinerator facilities around the country-each of
which is in a neighborhood that is 80 percent or more people of
color. That little chart said it all, and was an incredibly effective
educational tool.
The publicity surrounding an environmental justice case may
also encourage other, similarly situated communities to take collec-
tive action; seeing or hearing their own situation described on TV
or in the papers, and seeing what one community has done to fight
that situation, other communities may be inspired to fight back.95
91. See William L. F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Dis-
putes: Naming, Blaming and Claiming... 15 L. & Soc'y REV. 631 (1981).
92. See Steven Keeva, A Breath of Justice, 80 ABA J. 88 (Feb. 1994).
93. "Exposure through the press-building a community's movement through
public education and consciousness raising-is crucial to a successful struggle." Luke
W. Cole, The Struggle of Kettleman City for Environmental Justice: Lessons for the
Movement, 5 MD. J. CoNT. LEGAL ISSUES (forthcoming 1994).
94. Julia Siler Flynn, Environmental Racism: It Could Get Messy, Bus. WEEK, May
20, 1991, at 116.
95. For a lawsuit to have such effect, it must be collectivized and politicized. Fel-
stiner et al. describe one such incident:
Following a recent television program in Chicago in which a woman sub-
jected to a strip search during a routine traffic citation described her success-
ful damage claim against the police department, hundreds of women
telephoned the station with similar stories. In this instance, a legal victory
transformed shame into outrage, encouraging the voicing of grievances,
many of which may have become disputes. When the original victim chose a
legal mechanism for her complaint, a collective grievance against police
practices was individualized and depoliticized. When she broadcast her legal
victory on television, the legal dispute was collectivized and repoliticized.
542
1994] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE LITIGATION 543
Political education. By calling an environmental dispute by a dif-
ferent name-a civil rights dispute-and through the attendant
publicity surrounding such a suit, a community group can educate
its members, politicians and other communities. It may help local
residents, decision-makers and company officials see the problem
differently. More importantly, renaming the problem raises con-
sciousness in the general public about the issue of environmental
racism.96
Gaining allies. By calling a dispute a civil rights struggle, a group
may gain allies from other organizations in the region who previ-
ously may not have recognized the civil rights implications of the
community's struggle for environmental justice. (At the same
time, the group may lose allies who are squeamish about talking
about race issues.)
Judicial education. A last potential benefit of bringing civil rights
claims in environmental justice suits is judicial education. While
courts have not yet ruled favorably on an environmental justice
civil rights case, the increasing number of such cases being brought
may be having an effect in educating the judiciary. This judicial
education, along with mass political movement, was what made
civil rights claims possible in other areas such as school and public
facilities desegregation. Many of the first cases brought under civil
rights laws to challenge such segregation failed,97 and it was only
through years of strategically brought lawsuits-many of them un-
successful-that civil rights lawyers finally prevailed in court. For
this to be a successful strategy in the environmental justice move-
ment, however, three things must happen. First, we need to be
more strategic in the way we bring cases, rather than simply bring-
ing them in the ad hoc way we have up to this point;98 as a start,
Felstiner et al., supra note 91, at 643. The authors caution that "[i]deology-and the
law-can also instill a sense of disentitlement. The enactment of worker's compensa-
tion as the 'solution' to the problem of industrial accidents early in this century may
have helped convince workers to rely on employer paternalism to ensure their safety
and relinquish claims to control the workplace." Id.
96. One potential problem which has been identified by commentators such as
Gerald Torres is the diluting effect of calling every struggle one of "environmental
racism." Torres argues, not unconvincingly, that part of the power that the term "ra-
cism" has is contained in its sparing use. Gerald Torres, Understanding Environmen-
tal Racism, 630 COL. L. REV. 847 (1992).
97. See, e.g., Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903); Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537
(1896).
98. This strategic approach could mirror the carefully orchestrated efforts by the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund to end exclusion of African Americans from voting and
segregation in public schools, strategies which began in the 1920s and still continue to
this day. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 140, 301,
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this would involve following the hierarchy of legal theories laid out
in this Article. Second, we need to use these claims in factually
good cases, rather than in just any case, or risk poisoning the well
for those who come after us. 99 And third, when we bring the cases,
we need to make them as legally compelling as possible, relying
primarily on civil rights statutes rather than Constitutional
claims.100
IV. Conclusion
The history of the legal piece of the environmental justice move-
ment is long and varied. Several lessons have emerged from the
experiences of a number of grassroots groups which have used
375, 411 (2d ed. 1980); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976). To be more strate-
gic, we need to ensure that all necessary political work is being done by our clients in
a community as we do a lawsuit, we need to coordinate with other environmental
poverty lawyers and community groups around the country to be conscious of what
each other are doing, we need to network communities fighting the same companies
to come up with collective responses, and we need to bring cases in courts that are
likely to be sympathetic to civil rights claims.
99. Gerald Torres makes this point in a broader way in discussing the use of the
term "environmental racism":
[R]acism has been and should be a term of special opprobrium. We risk
having the term lose its condemnatory force by using it too often or inappro-
priately. By calling something racist when another term might suffice risk
subjecting the word to a kind of verbal inflation.
Torres, supra note 96, at 847. Similarly, calling every environmental justice dispute a
civil rights dispute will lessen the impact of the charge-as well as creating bad case
law if the charge is made, and lost, in court.
100. This operates on two levels. First, we need to be sure that we bring winning
cases; while the cases bringing Constitutional claims, discussed supra notes 73-88 and
accompanying text, may have had political value, their legal value at this point is
largely in showing us what not to do. Second, we need to be sure that we do all our
homework before we get into court so that we do not become victims of perceived
procedural flaws in our cases, because hostile judges will be looking for ways to get
rid of these cases without dealing with them on the merits. Three cases in the last
three years in the San Francisco Bay Area are instructive. In El Pueblo para el Aire y
Agua Limpio v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., the companion case to our state
case in the Kettleman City incinerator struggle, the judge dismissed one civil rights
claim against Chem Waste on grounds of ripeness, with the judge agreeing with Chem
Waste's claim that because the incinerator had just one of the four permits it needed
to be built, our suit was not ripe for adjudication. In another civil rights suit arising in
California challenging the placement of a garbage dump, Aiello v. Browning-Ferris,
Inc., 1993 WL 463701 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1993), the suit was dismissed. because the stat-
ute of limitations had run. In Clean Air Alternatives Coalition v. United States Dep't
of Transp., C-93-0721-VRW (N.D. Cal. filed July 16, 1993), the lead plaintiffs were
dropped from the suit because they claimed in the complaint that they were an incor-
porated community group when in fact they incorporated after the suit was filed. That
the success (or failure, in these cases) of such suits rests on such real or imagined
procedural defects is testament to the hostile climate in the courts, and to the need to
do good lawyering as well as visionary lawyering.
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legal approaches as part of their struggles for environmental jus-
tice.101 First, that lawsuits are most successful in the context of a
broad, political organizing campaign conducted by a community
group. Second, that legal challenges based on environmental laws
have the best chance of success in court. Third, that civil rights
challenges based on statutes, rather than the Constitution, have
greater legal potential. And finally, that civil rights suits have in-
trinsic political value, often creating benefits for the community
group involved whether or not the group wins in court. This Arti-
cle has briefly sketched the context and content of these lessons; let
us go forward and use them wisely in the service of the environ-
mental justice movement.
101. These conclusions are offered with a significant caveat: We need always re-
member that each situation presents a need for creative lawyering, and that no one
model or litigation hierarchy will fit every case. As Gerald Torres reminds us, "there
is no single model, or single slogan available to assess or to criticize the deficiencies of
current environmental policy. Easy reliance on slogans risks being both counter-pro-
ductive and ineffective." Torres, supra note 96, at 847.

